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I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Guy Remick dba Wasatch 
Towing and the Appellee, Granite Credit Union (hereafter credit union). 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is invoked in this matter pursuant to 
§ 78-2a-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
First Issue: Whether the tow company's failure to provide supporting 
evidence prevent it from asserting factual arguments. 
Second Issue: Whether a perfected security interest in a motor vehicle takes 
priority over a lien created by a towing company. 
Third Issue: Whether a towing company's failure to comply with the 
applicable statutes prevents it from asserting a lien for towing and storage against a 
lienholder. 
Fourth Issue: Whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to 
articulate Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Order. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is being appealed from a granting of a summary judgment motion. 
Following the granting of a summary judgment motion, this Court determines 
"only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." 
Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol. 2003 UT 19, P5, 70 P.3d 72. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal property - Lien subject to rights of 
secured parties. 
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow labor upon, any article of 
personal property at the request of the owner or other person entitled to possession 
thereof shall have a lien upon such article for the reasonable value of the labor 
performed and materials furnished and used in making such article or in altering or 
repairing the same, and may retain possession thereof until the amount so due is 
paid; provided such lien and right to possession shall be subject and subordinate to 
the rights and interests of any secured parties in such personal property unless such 
secured party has requested such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor 
upon such property. 
41-la-601. Lien validity - Security interest. 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2), a lien upon a vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor, except a lien dependent upon possession, is not valid against the 
creditors of an owner acquiring a lien by levy or attachment, or subsequent 
purchasers, or encumbrancers without notice until Sections 41-la-602 through 41-
la-606 have been complied with. 
(2) Security interests in inventory consisting in part of vehicles subject to 
registration under this chapter, that are held for sale by a person in the business of 
selling goods of that kind, shall be perfected under Section 70A-9a-310, except 
that buyers in the ordinary course of business, as defined in Section 70A-1-201, 
take free of the security interests as provided in Section 70A-9a-320. 
41-la-602. Application for original registration. 
(1) (a) If a vehicle is of a type subject to registration but has not been registered 
and no certificate of title has been issued, or if the vehicle has been registered or 
titled in another state or country, the owner shall file an application in the form for 
an original registration and issuance of an original certificate of title, 
(b) If the vehicle ownership has changed, the owner shall file an application in the 
form for an original certificate of title. 
(2) Each application shall be accompanied by all applicable taxes and fees under 
Part 12, Fee and Tax Requirements. 
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41-la-603. Issuance of new certificate of title - Lienholder. 
(1) Upon receipt of a title application the division shall file the application, and 
when satisfied as to the authenticity of the application, shall issue a new certificate 
of title in usual form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of one lien or 
encumbrance, if any, certified to the division as existing against the vehicle, vessel, 
or outboard motor. 
(2) If a certificate of title has been issued, and the same lienholder as shown by the 
records of the division only grants additional funds to the same owner as shown by 
the records of the division, no further recording is required and no subsequent 
certificate of title need be applied for or issued, if the original certificate or valid 
duplicate has remained in possession of the lienholder and the lien has not been 
released and the certificate has not been delivered to the owner. 
41-la-604. Filing effective to give notice of liens. 
The filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title under Sections 41-la-602 
and 41-la-603 constitute constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against 
the vehicle, vessel, and outboard motor to creditors of the owner and to subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers. 
41-la-605. Date of constructive notice. 
If the documents referred to in Section 41-la-602 are received and filed with the 
division within 30 days after the date the documents were executed, the 
constructive notice dates from the time of the execution of the documents; 
otherwise, constructive notice dates from the time of receipt and filing of the 
documents by the division as shown by its endorsement. 
41-la-606. Method of giving notice - Exceptions. 
The method provided in Sections 41-la-602 through 41-la-605, for giving 
constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance upon a registered vehicle is exclusive 
except for liens dependent upon possession and any lien or encumbrance filed as 
provided under this chapter, which are exempt from the provisions of Section 70A-
9a-311, and other provisions of law that otherwise require or relate to the recording 
or filing of instruments creating or evidencing title retention or other liens or 
encumbrances upon vehicles of a type subject to registration under this chapter. 
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72-9-603. Towing notice requirements - Cost responsibilities - Abandoned vehicle 
title restrictions - Rules for maximum rates and certification. 
(1) Except for tow truck service that was ordered by a peace officer, or a person 
acting on behalf of a law enforcement agency, or a highway authority, as defined 
in Section 72-1-102, after performing a tow truck service that is being done 
without the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor owner's knowledge, the tow truck 
operator or the tow truck motor carrier shall: 
(a) immediately upon arriving at the place of storage or impound of the vehicle, 
vessel, or outboard motor, contact the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction 
over the area where the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was picked up and 
notify the agency of the: 
(i) location of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
(ii) date, time, and location from which the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was 
removed; 
(iii) reasons for the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
(iv) person who requested the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
and 
(v) vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor's description, including its identification 
number and license number or other identification number issued by a state 
agency; and 
(b) within two business days of performing the tow truck service, send a certified 
letter to the last-known address of the registered owner and lien holder of the 
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor obtained from the Motor Vehicle Division or if 
the person has actual knowledge of the owner's address to the current address, 
notifying him of the: 
(i) location of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
(ii) date, time, location from which the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor was 
removed; 
(iii) reasons for the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
(iv) person who requested the removal of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor; 
(v) a description, including its identification number and license number or other 
identification number issued by a state agency; and 
(vi) costs and procedures to retrieve the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor. 
(2) Until the tow truck operator or tow truck motor carrier reports the removal as 
required under Subsection (l)(a), a tow truck motor carrier or impound yard may 
not: 
(a) collect any fee associated with the removal; and 
(b) begin charging storage fees. 
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(3) The owner of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor lawfully removed is only 
responsible for paying: 
(a) the tow truck service and storage fees set in accordance with Subsection (7); 
and 
(b) the administrative impound fee set in Section 41-6a-1406, if applicable. 
(4) The fees under Subsection (3) are a possessory lien on the vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor until paid. 
(5) A person may not request a transfer of title to an abandoned vehicle until at 
least 30 days after notice has been sent under Subsection (l)(b). 
(6) A tow truck motor carrier or impound yard shall clearly and conspicuously 
post and disclose all its current fees and rates for tow truck service and storage of a 
vehicle in accordance with rules established under Subsection (7). 
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act, the Department of Transportation shall: 
(a) set maximum rates that: 
(i) tow truck motor carriers may charge for the tow truck service of a vehicle, 
vessel, or outboard motor that are transported in response to: 
(A) a peace officer dispatch call; 
(B) a motor vehicle division call; and 
(C) any other call where the owner of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor has 
not consented to the removal; and 
(ii) impound yards may charge for the storage of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard 
motor stored as a result of one of the conditions listed under Subsection (7)(a)(i); 
(b) establish authorized towing certification requirements, not in conflict with 
federal law, related to incident safety, clean-up, and hazardous material handling; 
and 
(c) specify the form and content of the posting and disclosure of fees and rates 
charged by a tow truck motor carrier or impound yard. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This case is an appeal from a summary judgment 
granted by Judge Lewis of the Third District Court. The case originated as a 
replevin action filed by the credit union, a lender, to recover its collateral for a 
loan. The vehicle had been towed by Guy Remick doing business as Wasatch 
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Towing and was being held by Guy Remick who claimed a lien for towing and 
storage on the vehicle, ihe credit union brougiit a replevin accion seeking 
recovery of the vehicle. The Court Ordered Guy Remick to turn the vehicle over 
to the credit union pending the outcome of the case. After ruling in favor of the 
credit union on its Motion for Summary Judgment, the credit union ultimately 
obtained a Court Order allowing it to sell the vehicle and apply the sale proceeds to 
the loan balance. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Granite Credit Union initially states its strong objection to the summary of 
relevant facts stated by Guy Remick. Guy Remick in his Brief of Appellant sets 
forth a number of what he claims to be facts but the assertions that he made were 
not before the trial court and are not supported by the record. In addition, the 
statements or facts are not supported by reference to the record as is required by 
the rules. For these reasons, this Court should disregard the statement of facts set 
forth by the Appellant, Guy Remick. The only facts that were before the trial court 
were set forth in the First and Second affidavits of Thea Johnson, R. 15-20, 52-53. 
A summary of undisputed facts taken from the affidavits and relevant documents is 
set forth below. 
Granite Credit Union (the "credit union") is a credit union located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. R. 1 PI. The credit union made a loan to Hernan Rosales on 
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June 4,2002. The loan was secured by a 1997 Plymouth Voyager, VIN. 
2P4i^ F253y VK21 /96L. ine loan was in the amount oi $D,DUU.VU anu wa;> ieqiweu 
to be repaid at 5.5% interest with payments of $120.00 per month. R. 15 & 18. 
The credit union's security interest was perfected by the credit union being listed 
as a lienholder on the certificate of title. R. 8,16. The loan became delinquent and 
the credit union began looking for the vehicle to repossess it. R. 15, 52. The credit 
union was not able to locate the vehicle until the credit union received notice from 
Guy Remick's place of business that the vehicle had been towed and was being 
held by Mr. Remick. R. 52, 55, 56. On November 18, 2003, the credit union 
received a fax from Guy Remick seeking fees for towing and storage in the amount 
of $1,682.00. R. 53, 55. The credit union refused to pay for storage because the 
credit union believed that it had not received timely notice of impound of the 
vehicle. R. 53. 
The credit union, through its attorney, contacted Defendant Guy Remick to 
offer a settlement and indicate the credit union's position. No resolution was 
reached from the communication of the parties. R. 53, 56, 57. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The dollar amount at issue in this case is not of great consequence to the 
parties so much as the issues because of the recurring nature of the same fact 
pattern. The issues presented in this appeal have not been fully addressed by prior 
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published decisions. Granite Credit Union urges this Court to affirm the trial 
court's summary judgment in favor of the credit union for the following reasons. 
First, Guy Remick failed to file any affidavits that support his factual 
assertions. Because there was no evidence to support his claim that he had a lien 
on the vehicle or had the right to obtain the title to the vehicle, his claim must fail. 
Second, any claimed lien or right to a lien asserted by Guy Remick is 
subordinate to the interests of Granite Credit Union. Granite Credit Union 
properly perfected its security interest by complying with the relevant statutes 
which resulted in constructive and actual notice to Guy Remick that the credit 
union had a perfected security interest which took priority over Guy Remick's 
claimed lien. 
Third, Guy Remick failed to comply with the statute which would have 
given him a lien by waiting more than 100 days to give notice to Granite Credit 
Union when the statute required notice within two days. 
Fourth, the trial court's Order did not articulate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law but that is not a critical error in this case because Guy Remick 
concedes that the facts are not disputed and there is ample evidence in the record to 
support the Court's conclusion. In addition, this Court is obliged to affirm the trial 
court's ruling on any available basis. For these reasons, the trial court's Order 
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granting Granite Credit Union's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT GUY REMICK FAILED TO 
PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE THAT HE 
HAS A RECOGNIZABLE LIEN IN THE 
1997 PLYMOUTH VOYAGER. 
In order to obtain a lien and begin charging storage and towing fees, a tow 
truck operator must comply with Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-603 subparagraph (l)(a) 
and (b). There was no evidence before the trial court that the Defendant complied 
with any portions of the statute, including the proper notification of the parties and 
whether performing a tow truck service was properly completed in accordance 
with law. 
Guy Remick further argues that he complied with all necessary requirements 
to obtain a new title from the state. Again, these statements do not refer to the 
record and have no evidentiary support. Guy Remick provides no information 
regarding his compliance with any statute that would allow him to obtain a new 
title. 
Because there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Guy Remick 
complied with any of the prerequisites to obtaining a valid lien on the vehicle or a 
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new title, the trial court properly granted Granite Credit Union's Motion for 
Summary Judgment allowing the credit union to sell the vehicle and apply tne sale 
proceeds to the loan balance. 
POINT H 
GRANITE CREDIT UNION'S 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST 
TAKES PRIORITY OVER ANY 
POSSIBLE CLAIM OF GUY REMICK. 
The undisputed facts do not establish that Guy Remick had a recognizable 
lien in the 1997 Plymouth Voyager, However, even if a lien existed, the following 
analysis will establish the credit union' s'perfected security interest takes priority 
over any claimed lien of Guy Remick. 
The perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle is addressed by Utah 
Code Ann. §41-la-601 through 606. It is undisputed that the credit union 
complied with those provisions and had a perfected security interest in the 1997 
Plymouth Voyager that is the subject of this action at the time that the vehicle was 
towed and stored by Guy Remick. See copy of title certificate at R. 8. Section 41-
la-604 states that: 
The filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title 
under Sections 41-la-602 and 41-la-603 constitute 
constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against 
the vehicle, vessel, and outboard motor to creditors of the 
owner and to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. 
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Guy Remick was a creditor of the owner and/or a subsequent encumbrancer. 
He had constructive notice of the credit union's lien because the corrected title was 
issued on August 1,2002, long before the vehicle was towed. 
Section 41-la-601(l) states the following with respect to priority of liens in motor 
vehicles: 
Except as provided under Subsection (2), a lien upon a 
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor, except a lien 
dependent upon possession, is not valid against the 
creditors of an owner acquiring a lien by levy or 
attachment, or subsequent purchasers, or encumbrancers 
without notice until Sections 41-la-602 through 41-la-
606 have been complied with. 
Guy Remick claims a lien in the vehicle pursuant to section 72-9-603(4). 
That section states that "[t]he fees under Subsection (3) are a possessory lien on the 
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor until paid." However, the plain language of 
Section 41-la-601 makes it clear that a perfected security interest takes priority 
over the type of lien claimed by Guy Remick who is a subsequent encumbrancer 
through his claim of a storage and towing lien. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that a creditor who failed to 
comply with the lien-filing requirements (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-601 through 
606) had an unperfected security interest that was inferior to a subsequent 
purchaser who received an unencumbered title. Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 
770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988). In this case, however, the credit union has complied 
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with all filing requirements which gave not only constructive notice but also actual 
notice to Guy Remick that the credit union had a superior interest in the vehicle. 
The priority of liens on personal property is also dealt with at Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-2-3. That section states: 
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow 
labor upon, any article of personal property at the request 
of the owner or other person entitled to possession 
thereof shall have a lien upon such article for the 
reasonable value of the labor performed and materials 
furnished and used in making such article or in altering 
or repairing the same, and may retain possession thereof 
until the amount so due is paid; provided such lien and 
right to possession shall be subject and subordinate to the 
rights and interests of any secured parties in such 
personal property unless such secured party has requested 
such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor upon 
such property. 
The statute may also apply in this case because the Defendant is claiming a 
lien for the towing and storage of the vehicle. This statute is also consistent with 
Section 41-la-601 because of the rule that a perfected security interest takes 
priority over a lien of the type claimed by Guy Remick absent consent of the 
secured party. 
The credit union did not authorize any towing or storage. Therefore, the 
credit union's valid perfected security interest takes priority over Guy Remick's 
lien. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the summary judgment granted by 
the trial court. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER TOWING OR STORAGE 
FEES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
NOTICE STATUTES. 
Section 72-9-603 sets out the obligations of the tow truck operator with 
respect to towing of an abandoned vehicle. The tow truck operator is required to 
immediately contact the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the area 
where the vehicle was picked up and provide the law enforcement agency 
information about the identification of the vehicle, reason for its removal, the 
location from where the vehicle was towed, where the vehicle is located now, and 
at whose request the vehicle was removed. 
In addition, the statute requires that "within two business days of performing 
the tow truck service, send a certified letter to the last known address of the 
registered owner and Henholder of the vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor obtained 
from the motor vehicle division or if the person had actual knowledge of the 
owner's address..." Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-603(b). 
In this case, Guy Remick claims without supporting evidence that the towing 
was completed on August 4, 2003. Assuming this statement is accurate, Guy 
Remick had until August 6,2003 to notify the credit union who was the registered 
Henholder of the vehicle, that the towing had occurred so the credit union can take 
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appropriate action. However, Guy Remick failed to comply with that provision 
and did not send notice of the tow until November 20,2003, by his own admission 
more than 100 days after the towing of the vehicle. 
The obvious intent of the statute is that early notice be given to the owner 
and lienholder so that all parties can protect their rights as soon as possible before 
exorbitant storage charges are incurred. In this case, even though Guy Remick 
failed to give the credit union notice of the tow until more than 100 days following 
the tow service, he still wanted to charge the credit union for more than 100 days 
of storage fees. Guy Remick cannot benefit from his dilatory notice. To allow him 
to charge storage even though no notice had been timely provided would promote 
disobedience to the law in the hope of incurring large storage bills. Charging the 
storage fees without giving proper notice is clearly against the plain language of 
the statute. 
Utah Courts have refused to allow a party the benefit of a lien when that 
party has failed to comply with the statutory requirements. See A.K.&R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 1999 UT App 87; 977 P.2d 518 P40 
(denying the plumbing company a mechanic's lien because of its failure to comply 
with a licensing requirement). 
Because the Defendant failed to properly and timely notify the credit union 
regarding the towing and storage fees, Guy Remick is prohibited from asserting a 
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lien that takes priority over the credit union's perfected security interest. Summary 
Judgment in favor of the credit union was properly granted by the trial court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S LACK OF 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS DO 
NOT REQUIRE A REMAND. 
Guy Remick argues that the trial court made no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law nor did it find that there were issues as to any material fact. 
This argument does not benefit Guy Remick's position. Guy Remick concedes 
that the facts before the Court were undisputed. The only facts before the Court 
were set forth in the two Affidavits of Thea Johnson. Findings of fact were not 
required by the trial court because there was no dispute regarding what the facts 
were. In addition, the trial court made sufficient rulings on the record to determine 
what the basis for her decision was. For example, on page 18 of the transcript, the 
Court makes the following statement: 
It sounds to me like there is clear 
subordination here. It sounds to me like 
you've got the priority interest without 
question. R. 141, Tr. at 18: 17-19. 
The Court further makes the statement that: 
He may well be owed the money by the 
person who took out the loan, or the 
underlying debtor, but he subordinated and 
he didn't send out notice promptly. 
R. 141, Tr. at 21:20-22. 
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While the Court entertained some of the arguments and representations of 
counsel for Mr. Remick, she ultimately determined that the assertions were "not 
supported by affidavit or any other document." R. 141, Tr. at 22: 14-15. The 
Court ultimately found as follows: 
I find that the interest of Wasatch Towing is 
subordinated to the issue of Granite Credit 
Union. R. 141, Tr. at 25:10-11. 
Based upon the foregoing support in the record, the trial court made no error in its 
findings and conclusions that the interest of Guy Remick was subordinated to 
Granite Credit Union. 
In addition, this Court has an "obligation to affirm the trial court on any 
available basis..." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 1999 UT App 87; 977 P.2d 518, P15. As set forth above, there are 
ample reasons for this Court to affirm the trial court's decision. The trial court's 
decision was correct for several reasons, each of which have been articulated 
above. Therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate in 
all respects and should be affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the credit union has a superior lien to any lien of 
Guy Remick. In addition, Guy Remick failed to give proper notice of the towing 
and storage fees to the credit union and thereby should be prohibited from asserting 
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any lien that would take priority over the credit union's perfected security interest. 
The credit union was entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the summary judgment granted 
by the trial court in all respects. 
Dated this ]<*__ day of September, 2005. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Dean A. Stuart 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Motion for Summary Judgment to: 
Daniel Virgil Irvin 
Daniel V. Irvin, LLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this /ff day of September, 2005; postage prepaid. 
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